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In this brief note I discuss two citation analysis-based studies in history of analytic
philosophy that I recently published, highlighting some of their methodological
features. In the first section, I sum up the two studies, focusing on the three method-
ologies that were used (citation counting, co-citation analysis, and citation context
analysis). In the second section, I advance three remarks on these studies. Firstly, I
argue that citation analysis methods produce a formal representation of their ob-
ject, i.e. they shed light on the form rather than the content of the object. Secondly,
I argue that these methods have an ontological counterpart: they frame the object
under study at the documental level. I point out that this level should be distin-
guished both from the intellectual level that is studied by the internalist history
of philosophy and from the social level that is studied by the externalist history of
philosophy. Thirdly, I point out that citation analysis allows to reach a panoramic
point of view on the object under study. Such perspective unveils patterns that are
invisible at the micro-scale and that are difficult to study by traditional method-
ologies. I argue in particular that we need to develop new theories and concepts to
better understand the objects and phenomena we observe from this distant point
of view. In the third section, I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of citation
analysis. The main strengths are epistemological, heuristic, and methodological,
whereas the weaknesses relate to the losses caused by the translation of object at
the documental level, the risk of being distracted by mathematical properties that
lack a clear interpretation, and the problems involved in the validation of the re-
sults. I conclude by stressing the need for an interdisciplinary research programme
that integrates citation analysis, history of philosophy, and the social studies of
science.
* Università di Milano (eugenio.petrovich@ unimi.it).
Journal of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas 7(2018), 13, p. 11:1–11:21. Peer-reviewed.
The aim of this brief note is to present some methodological remarks on two
citation analysis-based studies in history of analytic philosophy I recently pub-
lished (Petrovich, 2018; Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018). Both studies applied sci-
entometric methods to the recent history of analytic philosophy. Scientometrics
is the discipline investigating the quantitative aspects of science and technol-
ogy (Nalimov & Mulchenko, 1971). Its main method is the analysis of citations
(citation analysis).
Scientific papers are mutually connected by citations, i.e. the cited references
that each scientific paper presents. These connections can be studied from dif-
ferent points of view: the number of citations a document or an author collects
over time can be counted, developing the so-called scientometric indicators;
similarities between papers can be calculated by counting howmany times they
are cited together (co-citation analysis); the relation between basic science and
technology can be assessed by studying how patents cite the scientific litera-
ture, and so on (Mingers & Leydesdorff, 2015). The studies I will comment on
here were both based on citation analysis and they both addressed the so-called
‘late analytic philosophy’, i.e. the analytic philosophy of the last thirty to forty
years (Tripodi, 2015, Chapter 4).
This note is structured as follows. Firstly, I will briefly sum up the two studies,
focusing on the three methodologies employed (citation counting, co-citation
analysis, and citation context analysis). Secondly, I will highlight three method-
ological features shared by both studies: I will argue that they provide a for-
mal representation of the object under study, that they address what I will call
the documental level of analytic philosophy, and that they allow to reach a
panoramic point of view on scientific and scholarly disciplines. Lastly, I will
discuss strengths and weaknesses of using citation analysis for historical pur-
poses, discussing three ‘epistemological risks’ that may arise in the context of
this kind of studies.
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1. Sum up of the two studies
1.1. Citation counting and co-citation analysis
In the first study (Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018), that I conducted with my
colleague Valerio Buonomo, we performed two citation analyses on late an-
alytic philosophy production, citation counting and co-citation analysis, using
the VOSviewer software (van Eck & Waltman, 2010). We took as target of our
analysis all the articles published in five highly prestigious analytic philosophy
journals (The Philosophical Review,The Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Noûs, Philos-
ophy and Phenomenological Research) between 1985 and 2014. Thus, we worked
on a corpus of 4 966 articles, containing 58 281 references to 17 926 authors.The
first analysis (citation counting) is a very basic one, consisting in counting the
citations a document or an author receives in a certain set of publications. The
outcome of the analysis is classically a ranking that allows to gauge the ‘im-
pact’, i.e. the citation score, of different documents and authors in the selected
literature. In our study, we presented rankings of most-cited documents and
most-cited authors in the five target journals. These rankings allowed to mea-
sure the weight, in terms of citations, of authors belonging to different phases of
analytic philosophy (early, middle and late) in contemporary analytic debates
(Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018, tabs. 1-4).
The second analysis (co-citation analysis) is a technique developed in the
context of science mapping, i.e. the research area that aims at describing the
structure of science based on the citation relationships amongst scientific docu-
ments (Börner, Theriault, & Boyack, 2015). Co-citation analysis was introduced
in the 1970s (Small, 1973). The underlying idea is that documents that are fre-
quently cited together (i.e. frequently co-cited documents) deal with similar
topic or belong to the same research area. Mapping co-citation relationships
allows then to reconstruct the sub-disciplinary structure of science. Results of
co-citation analysis are classically visualized in the form of ‘maps’, i.e. two-
or three-dimensional visualizations that represent visually the co-citation rela-
tionships between documents. VOSviewer, in particular, offers a two-dimensional
distance-based visualization, where the distance between the nodes represent-
ing the documents is inversely proportional to their co-citation frequencies:
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the higher the co-citation frequency between two documents is, the closer they
will be represented on the map. In our study, we used co-citation analysis to
map the structure of the articles published between 1985 and 2014 in the five
journals mentioned above. We mapped both the overall production and the
articles published in three consecutive decades ([1985-1994], [1995-2004] and
[2005-2014]), in order to investigate both the structure and the dynamics of the
field in the last thirty years. Regarding the overall map, the main finding was
that the map of analytic philosophy presents a clear sub-disciplinary structure,
where clusters of documents belonging to different sub-areas of the field (such
as metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, etc.) are easily recognizable
(Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018, Fig. 1). Regarding the longitudinal analysis, i.e.
the sequence of maps in time, the main result was that the co-citation network
becomes, from the first map to the last, more and more structured, changing
from a sparse network to a clusterized configuration where distinct clusters of
documents are evident (Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018, Figs. 2 a, b, c). We inter-
preted this pattern as the sign of an increasing specialization (i.e. fragmentation
into sub-disciplinary areas) of analytic philosophy.
1.2. Citation context analysis
In the second study (Petrovich, 2018) I used a different approach to the study
of citations, known as citation context analysis. In citation context analysis,
the portion of citing text surrounding the citation is considered. This allows to
classify citations according to their function (distinguishing for instance posi-
tive from critical citations, substantive from perfunctory citations) (Bornmann
&Daniel, 2008).The aim of the studywas to assess a claim recently made by his-
torians of analytic philosophy, namely that analytic philosophy has approached
in the last decades a style of intellectual production close to the Kuhnian nor-
mal science (see, amongst others, (Levy, 2003; Marconi, 2014; Putnam, 1997;
Richardson, 2008)). This was done by classifying the citations appearing in an-
alytic philosophy articles according to their epistemological function, and as-
sessing how the distribution of the different categories of citations changed
over time. Compared to the previous study, this one uses a larger time-window
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(1950-2010) in order to trace the evolution from middle to late analytic philoso-
phy. However, the corpus was much smaller, consisting of 60 articles: six sets of
10 papers, drawn from the same five journals of the previous study, with each
set drawn from a decade between 1950s to 2000s. The total number of citation
analyzed amounted to 1 293. The different size of the corpus depends on the
fact that the articles had to be close-read in order to classify the citations.
The main finding of the study was that the rate of State-of-the art citations
(i.e. the citations that are used to provide an overview of the sub-area to which
the paper is meant to contribute) increased steadily from 1960s to 2000s (Petro-
vich, 2018, fig. 5). At the same time, however, the rate of Positive citations (i.e.
the citations that are used to support the claims of the citing paper) followed
an up-and-down pattern (Petrovich, 2018, fig. 3). I interpreted these results as
indicating a fragmentation of the field into several definite sub-areas. Within
each of the sub-areas there is a lack of consensus among analytic philosophers,
as in traditional philosophical debates. Nevertheless, a consensus emerges at
the level of the whole field over the background structure of analytic philoso-
phy, i.e. analytic philosophers seem to agree on the sub-disciplinary divisions
of analytic philosophy. Thus, it can be concluded that a sort of soft paradigm—
concerning the structure of the field—has indeed emerged in the last decades.
I will not comment further the results of these two studies and will nowmove
to commenting some methodological features they shared, discussing also the
differences between citation analysis-based methods and the classic methods of
history of philosophy.
2. Methodological remarks
2.1. A formal representation
The two studies summarized above share—even if at different levels—a fea-
ture that is typical of scientometrics in general: they provide a formal repre-
sentation of their object (Wouters, 1999b, 1999a). In fact, the three analyses de-
scribed above (citation counting, co-citation analysis, citation context analysis)
all focused on the relationships between documents (namely, the citations), not
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on the contents of the documents. They dealt with the form rather than the con-
tent of late analytic philosophy. This is most evident in the case of co-citation
analysis: the visual outcome of the analysis is a network map where the cru-
cial point is the reciprocal distance between items on the map, not the items in
themselves. What a science map shows, is the structure of a set of documents,
i.e. the formal relations between them, not their content. The same holds for
citation counting: the citation score of a document or an author is the result
of the sum of the relationships it has with other documents or authors. This is
clear if we imagine the cited document as a node in a network: the number of
citations it collects is in fact nothing more than the number of links it has with
other documents. The citation score of a document is always dependent on its
being part of a set of other documents, it depends structurally on the fact that
it is not isolated. Thus, also the citation score is a formal property of a docu-
ment, incorporating into a single measure the number of links it has with all
the other documents. Lastly, in the case of citation context analysis, the focus is
again on the link between the cited and the citing documents. However, in this
case, we also take into consideration the kind of link, in order to enrich the cita-
tion network of the citing document with a further, qualitative dimension (the
epistemological function, in our case). Still, this qualitative information denotes
the relationship between documents, not directly their content, and is therefore
a property of the form.
Thus, all these analyses provide a formal representation of the object under
study, in the sense that they are mainly concerned with relations between items,
i.e. with structures. More specifically, they are grounded in a network approach
to their object: they represent their object as a set of nodes connected by a set
of links. Now, a crucial aspect of formal representations in general is that they
need to be interpreted in order to get a meaning¹. Note that the interpretation
works differently in the three cases, raising different methodological issues.
In the case of the science maps discussed in (Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018),
the formal representation is provided by the VOSviewer algorithm in the form
of a two-dimensional visualization of the co-citation relations between docu-
ments, the so-called map. As said above, the map presents a clear structure, i.e.
¹ Consider the case of formal languages. They need to be provided with an interpretation in order
to get a meaning in the natural language.
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documents are not arranged randomly. In particular, they are distributed in dif-
ferent clusters, that the VOSviewer algorithm detects and visualizes in different
colors. However, the meaning of the clusters is not directly showed in the map.
It needs to be inferred by looking at the contents of the documents of each clus-
ter. For instance, the red cluster showed in (Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018, Fig.1)¹
can be labelled “metaphysics” because it contains several documents (such as
Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds andQuine’sWorld and Object) the content of
which regards this area of analytic philosophy. Now, the interpretation of the
map consists precisely in relaying its structure (the clusters) with the intellec-
tual content of the documents it shows. This process is known in scientometric
literature as the ‘validation’ of the map and it is usually done by asking to ex-
perts of the field to look at the scientometric map and judge if it matches with
their representation of the research area. Therefore, the interpretation always
requires a qualitative element (the assessment of field experts) to match the
quantitative representation.
In the case of the citation counting, the interpretation of the data consists
in attributing a meaning to the citation score. In particular, the question that
should be answered is the following: what does a high (or low) number of ci-
tations mean? Note that this question opens two very different venues of re-
search: a descriptive and a normative. In the descriptive venue, the question
concerns, for instance, the relation between highly cited documents and Kuh-
nian paradigms (Small, 2003). Can they be considered the same? Do highly
cited documents play the role of Kuhnian paradigms? In the normative venue,
on the other hand, the question concerns the relation between the citation
score of a document and its scientific—or, in the case of analytic philosophy,
philosophical—quality.
¹ See the final page of this paper.
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In fact, the main application of scientometrics is in research performance
evaluation: scientometric indicators such as the Journal Impact Factor or the
H-Index are increasingly used in evaluation exercises to gauge the scientific
quality of journals, universities, laboratories and even individual researchers.
The underlying assumption is that citation scores can be used as proxies for
research quality. In particular, high citation score would mean a high research
quality. Note that the very notion of ‘research quality’ is intrinsically norma-
tive, because it implies the reference tostandards and desiderata.Thus, the inter-
pretation of citation scores, also in the case of analytic philosophy, potentially
opens a huge normative and meta-philosophical problem. Normative because it
regards the idea of research quality, andmeta-philosophical because it concerns
how philosophical research should be conducted. I think that the mere use of
citation counting cannot answer the question whether citations are proxies for
research quality. Nevertheless, if this equation is accepted, then citation score
would have a clear interpretation and citation counting would become indeed
a method to empirically measure philosophical quality.
Lastly, in the case of citation context analysis, the formal representation con-
sists in distributions of categories of citations over time, visualized, for instance,
in the form of box plots.The interpretation of these statistical estimates depends
on the meaning of the different categories used to classify citations. In turn, the
categories are designed based on an epistemological theory of the possible roles
of citations. If we change the categories or the theory that attributes meaning
to them, this affects the interpretation of the trends and patterns visible in the
statistics. In other terms, we have always to take into consideration the well-
known phenomenon of underdetermination: the evidence constraints but does
not determine our interpretation of it (Stanford, 2017). Once again, the inter-
pretation depends on a theoretical element that is not provided by the formal
representation alone, but should be supplied by the interpreter.
In sum, the first methodological remark I would like to make on these two
studies is that scientometrics and citation analysis provide a formal represen-
tation of their object. This form is a pure mathematical or statistical structure
that has no meaning per se. The meaning needs to be introduced by the human
element, and this is the role of the historian. Therefore, the use of quantita-
tive methods does not cancel out the historian from the equation, but, on the
contrary, highlights his/her role as an interpreter and, even, a theory-builder.
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2.2. The documental level
The different approaches to the history of philosophy can be classified in a
spectrum ranging from internalist to externalist approaches (Rorty, Schneewind,
& Skinner, 1984). Internalist approaches focus on intellectual contents, such as
philosophical theories, arguments, notions, concepts, etc., whereas externalist
approaches focus on the historical, social and political contexts of philosophi-
cal ideas. In the label history of philosophy, internalists put the emphasis on
philosophy, rather than on history: the object of historical reconstruction is the
‘context of justification’ of philosophical doctrines, not their historical and so-
ciological genesis (the ‘context of discovery’), which is the object of externalist
history of philosophy (Reichenbach, 1938).
The most internalist kind of history of philosophy is the so-called “rational
reconstruction” (Rorty, 1984). In this kind of history, all historical factors are ig-
nored, and the doctrines of the past philosophers are discussed and assessed as
they were contemporary colleagues. Past philosophical theories are discussed
from a sort of a-temporal point of view, in the pure “space of reasons”. On the
other end of the spectrum, we find full-fledged externalist approaches to the
history of philosophy. Sociology of philosophy is the main representative of
this kind of approach (Kusch, 1995, 2000). Following the tradition of Mannheim
sociology of knowledge as well as the Strong Programme in sociology of sci-
ence, it aims at showing how the ideas are shaped (and even determined) by
the social context in which they are produced. In between these two extremes
there are intermediate approaches that mix internalist and externalist consider-
ations, attributing from time to time different weights to intellectual and social
factors.
What is the position of the scientometric approach in the internalist-externalist
spectrum? I think that in order to answer this question, we need to frame the
internalist-externalist debate in ontological terms, i.e. we need to focus on the
kind of object the two approaches focus on. As we said above, internalist ap-
proaches consider philosophy as a set of ‘ideas’, i.e. as a set of intellectual ‘items’
that have at least a certain degree of independency from their creators. In other
terms, ideas can be discussed per se: they can be put in relation with other ideas,
if they are arguments they can be rejected, if they are notions they can be clar-
ified, etc. In internalist history of philosophy, ideas are considered as inhabi-
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tants of what Popper calls theThird World, the world of “objective knowledge”,
that is distinct both from the First World (the physical world) and the Second
World (the mental world) (Popper, 1979). On the other hand, in externalist ap-
proaches, ideas are considered as essentially connected with their context. In
fact, they are considered as the product of a certain disposition of social features.
They cannot be considered as independent entities. In fact, the true objects of
externalist histories of philosophy are not ideas, but agents, i.e. the producers
of ideas. Agents use ideas as resources to advance their own interests, and the
evolution of ideas in time can be explained only by taking in consideration their
strategic use (Collins, 1998; Kusch, 1995)¹. Ideas are social objects that are not
individuated by a set of intellectual commitments, but by the community of ac-
tors advancing them.
The scientometric approach is, I think, intermediate between the internalist
and externalist approach.This intermediate status is a direct consequence of the
methodology that is typical of scientometrics. Scientometrics does not address
directly scientific activity, but only its public outcome, i.e. articles published in
scientific journals. From these articles, citations are extracted, and the formal
relations between pieces of knowledge are studied via citation analysis. There-
fore, publications and citations are the true object of scientometrics, they are
the ontological counterpart of the scientometric method. Every application of
scientometric methods to an object of study, such as analytic philosophy, will
involve a translation of that object into a relevant set of documents and cita-
tions. This translation is a form of operationalization, i.e. the transformation of
a concept into something to which a certain form of research method can be
applied successfully (Chang, 2009)². In both the studies I am commenting, late
¹ This approach has never been fully developed in history of philosophy. In Science and Technology
Studies, however, it is extensively promoted by the Strong Programme and, from a certain point of
view, by the Actor-Network-Theory of Bruno Latour (2003).
² Providing “operational definitions” of elusive concepts is a fundamental part of social science
methodology (Calhoun, 2002).
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analytic philosophy was operationalized into a set of documents, defining it at
what we may call the documental level.
Thus, in scientometrics, the object of study is neither defined as a set of ideas
(internalist approach) nor as a set of agents (externalist approach), but as a set
of published documents (publications). Publications can be considered as the
interface between the abstract realm of ideas and the social field of actors, since
they share features of both “Worlds”, to use Popper’s phrase¹. They share with
ideas the property of existing independently of their creators, since they are
public objects that can circulate even beyond the intentions of their authors. At
the same time, they share with the social level the property of being concrete
and spatio-temporally determined. Publications have definite coordinates and
boundaries, they are not abstract objects in the intellectual space. Therefore,
scientometrics allows to capture an object of study at an intermediate level that
does not coincide neither with the strictly intellectual point of view, typical
of internalist history of philosophy, nor with the strictly social point of view,
typical of externalist history of philosophy. Scientometrics is therefore a sort of
ontological middle point between internal and external history².
2.3. Towards a massive and panoramic history
Traditional history of philosophy basically relies on one key method: close
reading of texts. This poses serious limitations to the amount of sources that
can be handled by the historian of philosophy. One of the main motivations for
turning to ‘distant reading’ methodologies is in fact the intention to overcome
the cognitive limits of the individual scholar, using computers and algorithms
to enlarge enormously the amount of data that can be used in the analysis. This
paves the road to a massive, data-driven history. Scientometrics shares with
¹ In Science and Technology Studies, the role of documents in science is gaining considerable
attention in the last years (see Felt, Fouché, Miller, & Smith-Doerr, 2017, Chapter 2).
² The question whether the documental level may be considered as a sort of Hegelian synthesis
between the intellectual and the social is an interesting one, that I think should be addressed in
future research.
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distant reading (and with digital humanities more generally) this ‘big-data’ ap-
proach. Citation analyses are conducted on thousands, even millions of docu-
ments. Furthermore, it has been argued that scientometric indicators are mean-
ingful only if they are performed on huge amounts of data, adopting a sort of
‘thermodynamic’ approach that focuses on the aggregate rather than the indi-
vidual behavior (Price, 1986; van Raan, 1998). As we saw above, the map of late
analytic philosophy we presented in the first study was the result of process-
ing almost 5 000 articles: it would have been simply impossible to read all of
them in the traditional way. The same holds for the citation counting analysis:
recording manually the citations to authors and documents would have been a
tremendously time-consuming task.
The shift from small to large sets of texts has two important consequences:
it shifts the scale from the micro to the macro and the focus from the individ-
ual to the collective. This has the effect of moving towards what we may call a
panoramic point of view. The panoramic point of view allows to observe phe-
nomena that cannot be perceived at the micro level, or that can be perceived
only qualitatively as anecdotal evidence. This is the case of the phenomenon of
specialization. The trend towards an increasing specialization is perceived by
analytic philosophers but it can hardly be investigated at the micro-level and
with close reading methods, because it is a trend involving the whole field, not
a specific author or philosophical theory. Hence, it is difficult to test by tradi-
tional methods whether or not the perception of analytic philosophers is true.
The panoramic view of the science mapping, on the other hand, allows to ob-
serve the dynamics of the whole field, and therefore to check the perception of
the field members against quantitative patterns. Indeed, as we saw above, the
use of longitudinal co-citation analysis (i.e. the mapping of analytic philosophy
production by decades) allowed to observe a clusterization pattern that can be
interpreted as the effect of the fragmentation of analytic philosophy into defi-
nite sub-specialty areas.
I said that the panoramic point of view changes the scale of the analysis, al-
lowing to detect macro-phenomena such as specialization, but also the focus,
highlighting the collective dimension of a field. Again, this is evident for all the
kinds of citation analysis. Citation analysis as such involve the use of citations,
and citations are a sign of the embedding of the documents into a fabric of doc-
uments, i.e. a network, that is constitutively a collective entity. The individual
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authors, when they cite, contribute to the weaving of the fabric of documents,
and their collective efforts results in the overall structure of the network.
Now, I suggest that we should consider the idea that the direction of cau-
sation goes not only from the individual to the structure, but also on the other
way, from the structure to the individual. In other terms, I suggest the existence
of feedback mechanism from the structure to the individual. This means that the
individual action is constrained by the structure, i.e. the structure reduces the
degrees of freedom of the individual. If this suggestion is correct, the structure
and the trend that are revealed by citation analysis can be interpreted as the
collective constraints that the individual actors face when they interact with the
field. The physical metaphor of the ‘field’ is particularly suitable for describ-
ing this interaction. A gravitational field is revealed by the effect it has on the
masses interacting with it—and this effect is manifested as gravitational attrac-
tion on the masses. In the same way, I suggest interpreting the clusters in the
maps as different centers of gravity that exert a force on the individual actors,
restraining their possible actions. Furthermore, the trend revealed in the lon-
gitudinal analysis can be interpreted by another physical notion: the notion of
inertia. An individual actor that wants to invert the trend (for example, address
general philosophical themes instead of specialized and delimited philosophical
puzzles) must deal with the inertia of the whole field, that pushes all the actors
towards specialization.
In sum, the panoramic point of view that results from operating with huge
amounts of data does not only modify the scale of the studies but allows to
unveil new types of dynamics. I think that an important task for historians of
philosophy that want to use thesemethods consists in developing a good theory
of these dynamics, forging new concepts for phenomena that are visible only
from the panoramic perspective¹.
¹ This point was also highlighted by Franco Moretti in his lecture “Patterns and interpretation”,
delivered at the “Distant Reading and Data-Driven Research in the History of Philosophy” Confer-
ence, Università di Torino, 16-18 January 2017.
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3. Strengths and weaknesses of citation analysis
Scientometric methods based on citations present both strengths and weak-
nesses when they are used for historical purposes. I already mentioned some of
them in the previous paragraphs. I want now to systematize them, starting from
the strengths. I think that they can be divided into epistemological, heuristic,
and methodological strengths:
1. From an epistemological point of view, the main strength of scientomet-
rics is that it allows to operationalize elusive notions (such as ‘special-
ization’) into definite and measurable features. This happens because the
translation of the object of study into a documental object (i.e. into a set
of documents) plays a crucial role in the very methodology of sciento-
metrics. The operationalization allows to test by quantitative means his-
torical claims put forward by historians of philosophy. I think this is an
important step towards a more robust and empirically oriented history
of philosophy.
2. The panoramic point of view that is reached when a massive amount of
documents is analyzed via citation analysis allows to unveil trends and
patterns that are invisible at the micro scale and from a close-reading
standpoint. Thus, this perspective can generate new ways of reading the
historical material, providing a significant heuristic gain to the historian
of philosophy.
3. Regarding the methodology, it must be stressed that scientometric and
citation analysis are not incompatible with close reading or traditional
methodologies. In fact, quantitative and qualitative methods can be cou-
pled, for instance in the citation context analysis. This allows to enhance
both kinds of analysis and, most of all, to interpretmore clearly the results
of quantitative analyses. As we saw above, data do not speak by them-
selves: they need always to be interpreted within a theoretical frame-
work. The formal representation has to be filled with a meaning. Quali-
quantitative methods can indeed enable the interpretation of results.
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At the same time, however, there are several weaknesses of citation analysis
as an historical tool that cannot be ignored. There are technical limitations as
well as what we may call ‘epistemological risks’.
Concerning the technical limitations, it must be noticed that the available
citation databases (Clarivate’s Web of Science, Elsevier’s Scopus and Google’s
Google Scholar) have a limited coverage and historical depth. Books and mono-
graphs are not indexed in the database¹ and there are biases in the coverage of
journals. In particular, English-language journals are disproportionally repre-
sented in the databases. Moreover, citation data before 1980s are only partially
reliable. In general, the coverage of Humanities and Social Sciences is unsatis-
factory, compared to the natural sciences and bio-medical areas.These technical
limitations are widely discussed in the scientometric literature and the reader
can refer to this literature formore details on this point². For the purposes of this
note, I think it is more interesting to discuss some ‘epistemological risks’ that
are involved in using citation analysis for historical purposes. They concern the
losses in the operationalization process, the independent life of mathematical
objects, and the problem of validation of results.
3.1. Losses in the operationalization process
When the intellectual level (the level of ideas) is translated to the documental
level (the level of publications), this does not happen without losses. Further-
more, if we consider only the publications indexed in a database, this imposes
a further limitation to the object we study. By focusing only on the published
product of philosophical research, we lose the entire process of production of
the philosophical contents. We lose what we may call ‘philosophy in action’,
echoing Latour’s notion of “science in action”. The losses involved in the oper-
ationalization should always be kept in mind when we interpret the results. It
is important to be clear about what aspect of our object we are describing and
¹ Web of Science has recently launched a Book Citation Index, but, at the moment, it is still too
limited in coverage to be useful.
² See (Nederhof, 2006) and (Hellqvist, 2009) for an overview of the main technical limitations in
applying citation analysis to the humanities.
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about the fact that the description is constrained by the method we use. We
should always be wary of excessive generalizations.
3.2. The independent life of mathematical objects
Quantitative methods in general produce quantitative images of their object.
The quantitative features can hence bemanipulated bymathematical means (for
instance, by statistical analysis). In the case of scientometrics, we saw above
that the documental level is represented as a network. A network can be de-
scribed mathematically as a mathematical object—a graph—so that the docu-
mental level can be related to the mathematical theory of graph. This theory
offers a lot of interesting tools for studying the properties of networks (for ex-
ample, all the different measures of ‘centrality’, such as degree centrality, be-
tweenness, Eigenvalues, etc.). However, a concrete risk arises of being lost into
the mathematical properties of the network, losing sight of the meaning that
such properties have for our object of study. An example would help to clarify
this point. Imagine we analyze the science map of late analytic philosophy with
a cluster algorithm. This algorithm “recognizes” the different sub-communities
of the network, grouping similar items into the same cluster. Then, it is pos-
sible to ask whether there is a relation between the number of clusters and
the number of items contained in each cluster. Is there any mathematical re-
lation holding between these two quantities? Is it dependent from the cluster
algorithm we choose?Questions like these are interesting, but it is not straight-
forward that their answers would shed light on the object that is represented
with the science map. They seem to concern more the representation than the
object represented, or, to use the terminology introduced above, they seem to
regard only the formal properties of the object.Therefore, quantitative methods
raise technical and mathematical problems that have ‘a life of their own’: the
risk is to pursue these problems losing sight of the target.
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3.3. Lack of validation vs. reinventing the wheel
In discussing the strengthens of scientometrics as a tool, I highlighted the
fact that it can unveil patterns that cannot be observed with classical methods.
However, this also raises the issue of the validation of the results obtained by
scientometric methods. If they unveil patterns that are invisible at the quali-
tative level, how can they be assessed? Imagine that a science map cannot be
easily interpreted by the experts of the field: should we reject the results of the
map or the assessment of the experts? There is also a mirror risk: if the experts
recognize easily the map as a faithful representation of their field, what is the
advantage that is gained by using science maps instead of the classic reviews
of the literature? The use of quantitative images of our object of study presents
therefore a double risk: if they match the already-known representation, then
they add nothing to our knowledge; if they contradict the judgement of the ex-
perts, then we lack an independent source of validation for the results. In sum,
scientometric and citation analysis are in between the Scylla of reinventing the
wheel and the Charybdis of meaningless results.
4. Conclusions
In this brief note, I discussed three main methodological aspects of the two
studies I recently published on the history of recent analytic philosophy. I fo-
cused on the methodological consequences of the use of scientometrics and
citation analysis methods as research tools. Firstly, I argued that these methods
produce a formal representation of their object, i.e. they shed light on the form
rather than the content of the object. The role of the historian is to attribute a
meaning to the formal mathematical structure by providing an interpretation
of the data. Secondly, I argued that these methods have an ontological coun-
terpart: they frame the object under study at the documental level, i.e. as a set
of (published) documents. This level of analysis should be distinguished both
from the intellectual level (the ideas) and the social level (the social actors) and
considered as the interface between them. Thirdly, I pointed out that sciento-
metrics allows to reach a panoramic point of view on the object under study.
Such perspective allows to unveil patterns that are invisible at the micro-scale
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and that are difficult to study by traditional methodologies (i.e. close-reading). I
argued that we need to develop new theories and concepts to better understand
the objects and phenomena we observe from this distant point of view. Lastly,
in the third section I highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of scientomet-
rics and citation analysis. The main strengths are epistemological (enhancing
the empirical test of historical claims), heuristic (generating new hypotheses)
and methodological (coupling with close-reading method). On the other hand,
the weaknesses regard the losses caused by the translation of object at the doc-
umental level, the risk of being distracted by mathematical properties that lack
an interpretation, and the problems involved in the validation of the results.
I think that the scientometric study of philosophy is just at the beginning.
It should be extended both in the scope, considering other areas of philoso-
phy, and in the theoretical machinery: as I stressed many times in this note, we
need to develop new concepts to interpret insightfully the results of quantitative
methods. Therefore, I believe that we need a closer interaction with other areas
of philosophy (namely, philosophy of science, historical and social epistemol-
ogy) and with the social sciences (sociology of science, Science and Technology
Studies), promoting a true inter- and trans-disciplinary research programme.
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